Recognition of Foreign Governments and Its Effect on Private Rights by Hudson, David Ernest
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 1 
Issue 4 November 1936 Article 2 
1936 
Recognition of Foreign Governments and Its Effect on Private 
Rights 
David Ernest Hudson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Ernest Hudson, Recognition of Foreign Governments and Its Effect on Private Rights, 1 MO. L. REV. 
(1936) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol1/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Recognition of Foreign Govern-
ments and Its Effect on
Private Rights*
DAVID ERNEST HUDSON**
The effect of recognition or non-recognition of foreign governments was
at one time a simple problem, compared to the situation that has prevailed
during the past two decades. The change that has come about in recent
years is mainly due to the change in the attitude which is taken by our Gov-
ernment and by some other governments with respect to according recogni-
tion to a new foreign government.
The principle announced by Jefferson and adhered to during the first
half of the nineteenth century was "to acknowledge any government to be
rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared."
It was the fact of control rather than any other circumstance which was re-
garded as the decisive test.' However, the instructions to our foreign repre-
sentatives gradually began to emphasize another consideration-the willing-
ness and ability of a new government to honor foreign obligations of the
state. These were the basic considerations in American foreign policy at
least until the Civil War.
In 1861 Secretary Seward announced a somewhat different policy to the
effect that a revolutionary government which gained control by sheer force
of arms and in defiance of an existing constitution ought not to be recog-
nized by the United States until it was assured that the change was adopted
by the people rather than imposed upon them against their will. This idea
found expression in American state papers, although the forms of utterance
lacked uniformity. This principle seems also to have been adopted in con-
nection with the recognition of the government of General Estrada in Nica-
ragua in 1911, and in the withholding of recognition from the government of
General Huerta in Mexcio in 1913 and 1914, and later from the Tinoco
government in Costa Rica.
In 1923 the United States Government participated in the Washington
conference of five Central American republics (Guatemala, Honduras, Sal-
vador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica), which resulted in the adoption of the
General Treaty of Peace and Amity of February 7, 1923,2 Article II of which
*This Article is based on material used in an address by the Author before the Inter-
national Law Section of American Bar Ass'n.
**Member of N. Y. Bar; Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United
States.
1. "The policy of the United States, announced and practiced upon occasions for
more than a century, has been and is to refrain from acting upon conflicting claims to the
de jure control of the executive power of a foreign state; but to base the recognition of a
foreign government solely on its defacto ability to hold the reins of administrative power."
Directions to the American minister in Colombia in 1890, 1 MOORE, DIOEST or INTvER-
NATIONAL LAW (1906) 139.
2. (1923) 17 AM. J. INT. L. Supp. 117.
(312)
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provided that "the governments of the contracting parties will not recognize
any other government which came into power in any of the five republics
through a coup d'etat or a revolution against a recognized government, so
long as the freely elected representatives of the people thereof have not
constitutionally reorganized the country." Although the United States
did not sign the conventions or adhere to them, Secretary Hughes later an-
nounced that the United States was in "hearty accord" with the policy of
non-recognition announced in this treaty, and that its attitude would be
governed thereby. This policy was later confirmed and followed as to the
signatories to the Washington Treaty.3 Soon, however, this treaty policy
of non-recognition became the subject of severe criticism. It was objected
to as a form of intervention in the domestic affairs of foreign countries and
an unwarranted form of diplomatic pressure resulting in a violation of the
rights of sovereignty. Consequently, certain exceptions were soon made
by the parties to the treaty and by the United States. 4 This so-called doc-
trine of "legitimacy of origin" is clearly a departure from the principles laid
down by Jefferson.
A further change in our national policy of recognition came about in the
case of the Russian Revolution, which resulted in the overthrow of the
Czarist government and the establishment of the Russian Socialist Feder-
ated Soviet Republic, on November 7, 1917. President Wilson refused to
recognize the Soviet Government mainly on the grounds that it did not have
the sanction of the Russian people, and that the United States would not
recognize a government which refused to respect its international obliga-
tions." President Coolidge liberalized, to some extent, the policy adopted
by President Wilson. 6 He stated, however, that one of the principal objec-
tions to recognition of the Russian Government, was "the active spirit of
enmity to our [American] institutions." In a later statement, Secretary
Hughes adopted an uncompromising attitude and stated that "most serious
is the continued propaganda to overthrow the institutions of this country.
This Government can enter into no negotiations until these efforts directed
from Moscow are abandoned." 7 Substantially the same attitude was taken
by Secretary Kellogg and later by the Hoover Administration. But in
October, 1933, President Roosevelt addressed a communication to the Soviet
Government, referring to the abnormal relations then existing and inviting
"frank friendly conversations" with the view of removing difficulties between
the two nations.8  As a result thereof, conferences were held in Washington
3. Secretary Kellogg's note declining to recognize the Chamorra Government in
Nicaragua, N. Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1926, at 14.
4. Recognition of El Salvador, Department of State, Press Release, Weekly Issue
No. 226, Jan. 27, 1934, Publication No. 554, at 51. Elsewhere in Latin America the
United States has followed its traditional policy, as for example, in the recognition during
recent years of governments in Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Panama, Argentine, and Cuba.
5. Dewar, Britain's Recognition of the Soviet Government (Dec. 15, 1924) 3 FOREIGN
ArFAIRs 316.
6. 65 CONG. REc. 451 (1923).
7. Ibid.
8. Department of State, Press Release, Weekly Issue No. 212, Oct. 21, 1933, Pub-
lication No. 517, at 226.
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early in November, 1933, participated in by representatives of the United
States Government and the Soviet Government. On November 16, 1933,
President Roosevelt addressed a note to Mr. Litvinoff, Russian Commissar
for Foreign Affairs, which gave recognition to the Soviet Government.
Thus, over a period of sixteen years, our government refused to recog-
nize the Soviet regime, not on the grounds that that regime did not exercise
control and authority in the territory of the former Russian Empire, but for
other purely political reasons.
Consequently there resulted an anomalous situation which prevailed
during that period. Admittedly there existed in Russia a government ex-
ercising control over its own people and territory. Americans continued to
trade with Russia and to travel in Russia. Thousands of Russian-born
aliens were admitted to the United States under the immigration laws, and
many of them were admitted to citizenship in the United States.9 Docu-
ments were executed in Russia for use in the United States and were accepted
by American courts as officially authenticated." The United States Govern-
ment participated in international conferences and conventions, in which
the Soviet Government officially took part." The Soviet Government was
accorded defacto and dejure recognition by numerous other sovereign states. 12
But all the while recognition was refused by the Government of the United
States.
By far the larger body of our law in recent years with respect to the
effect of recognition and non-recognition, relates to the questions arising out
of the Russian situation. It is for that reason that this discussion is devoted
mainly to the disputes between those two governments and their nationals.
This situation necessarily gave rise to many legal disputes, resulting in
a large amount of litigation in American courts. Thus, before and since
recognition, our courts have been presented with difficult and complicated
questions. Because of the anomalous and unprecedented situation, it is
not surprising that many of the courts' decisions lack clarity and con-
sistency.1
One of the first questions that arose was as to the unrecognized govern-
ment's standing in court. In this connection, it is interesting to note that
the courts have adhered to the distinction between a "state" and a "govern-
ment." The Constitution of the United States extends the judicial power
to controversies between "a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states."
In a case involving Mexico, decided a few months before recognition was
extended to the Mexican government, a Superior Court of Massachusetts
(Essex County, May, 1923) entertained a suit by the "United States of
Mexico," although there was then no recognized government of Mexico.
9. ANNUAL REP. COMM. OF NATURALIZATION (1930).
10. Werenjchik v. Ulen Contracting Corp., 229 App. Div. 36 (1930).
11. As to whether this involved recognition of the Soviet government, see Hudson,
Recognition and Multipartite Treaties (1929) 23 Am. J. I NT. L. 126.
12. See (1934) 28 Am. J. INT. L. 97, for a list of such states.
13. On the general subject, see HUDSON, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed.
1936) 77 et seq.
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The court, however, adverted to the possibility that pending negotiations
might soon result in recognition. In the case of Russia, the United States
government not only declined to recognize the Soviet Government, but con-
tinued to recognize officials of the old defunct Provisional Government.
Hence the courts permitted the representatives of the old government to
institute and maintain actions in the name of the "Russian Government,"
later changed to "State of Russia."' 14 This principle of continuity of the
life of the "state" finds general acceptance both in judicial decisions,5 and
in the writings of authorities on international law.'
6
On the other hand, prior to recognition, the courts denied the Soviet
Government any standing in court, and refused to permit it to sue.' 7  The
Court of Appeals of New York said that the right of a foreign state to sue
in American courts rests, in the absence of treaty, on international comity,
and in the absence of recognition comity did not exist. The court further
stated that it would be against public policy to permit an unrecognized
government to recover funds which might be used against the interests of
the United States.
Likewise, a suit against the Russian Government was not allowed."8
The New York Court of Appeals stated that although there existed no com-
ity, the acts of a de facto government cannot be questioned by our courts,
and further that the Soviet Government had not submitted itself to our law.
It would, indeed, be a dangerous practice to permit our courts to entertain
private claims against foreign governments, recognized or unrecognized.19
Nor is the principle of immunity of a de facto sovereign government"
limited to cases in which an attempt is made to bring the "person" into
court, i. e., the government, as such: it was applied in a case in the United
14. Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 293 Fed. 135 (S. D. N. Y. 1923),
a.ff'd sub nominee, Lehigh Valley R. R. v. State of Russia, 21 F. (2d) 396 (C. C. A. 2d,
1927); State of Russia v. National City Bank, 69 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934). There
is some doubt, however, as to whether under the Soviet constitution the present Russian
state is the same entity in contemplation of law as the old Czarist state. That the Soviet
Republic is a new state, and that the Soviet Government is not the successor of the Czarist
Government in the old State of Russia, is the view taken by BATY, CANONS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (1930) 229.
15. The Sapphire, 78 U.S. 164 (1870); Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (1808); Lepesch-
kin v. Gosweiler & Co., Switzerland, Federal Tribunal, 1923; 71 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX
ET REVUE JUDICIAIRE 582, translation in HUDSON, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d
ed. 1936) 122.
16. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. by Roxbury) § 77.
17. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139
N. E. 259 (1923); the Rogday, 279 Fed. 130 (N. D. Cal. 1920); The Penza, 277 Fed. 91
(E. D. N. Y. 1921).
18. Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, 234 N. Y. 372, 138
N. E. 24 (1923). See also Nankivel v. Omsk All Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 150,
142 N. E. 569 (1923).
19. Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation (1924) 37 HARv. L. REv. 338, 349; Dick-
inson, The Unrecognized Government or State in English and .4merican Law (1923) 22
MicH. L. REv. 118, 126.
20. The distinction between defacto and de jure governments is challenged by some
writers. See Borchard, The Unrecognized Government in American Courts (1932) 26 Am.
J. I NT. L. 262.
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States District Court for the Southern District of New York2 in which the
plaintiff asserted title to gold found in possession of the defendant, which
gold had been confiscated by the Soviet Government and thereafter shipped
to the defendant. The court held that a soverign could not be brought into
court without its permission, and that the court could not pass on the title
to property claimed by a sovereign, regardless of whether such sovereign
had been recognized, since its existence might be proved in other ways than
by recognition.
The cases indicate, therefore, that the principle of immunity is not
dependent upon diplomatic recognition. On the other hand, the right of a
foreign government to sue in our courts is dependent upon recognition.
That right does not follow from sovereignty alone, but exists by virtue of
comity, which, in turn, is dependent upon the existence of friendly diplo-
matic relations.
But when we come to deal with private rights, the questions are much
more complicated and difficult. It is in this field that the greatest contri-
bution has been made to the development of the law in respect to the recog-
nition of foreign governments. By far the larger number of cases have been
concerned with the rights of individuals and corporations as affected by the
acts, laws and decrees of unrecognized governments, particularly the Soviet
Government. The decisions in this field have presented some glaring in-
consistencies. This, however, might be regarded as inevitable, because of
the complexity of the situation and its unprecedented character.
The often stated rule that recognition is a political matter, and that the
courts are bound by the action taken by the political branch of the Govern-
ment, has been found to be of little assistance to the courts in the recent
past. Our courts have been faced with a situation in which our government
denied recognition to a foreign government that was admittedly a de facto
government in complete control of the territory in which it operated. The
laws and decrees of the de facto government gave rise to many rights and
duties which could not in justice be ignored elsewhere. It has been found,
therefore, that former precedents could not be rigidly followed in dealing
with problems presented by the Russian situation. The Civil War furnished
precedents which gave some lead when this new situation arose. In the
case of Texas v. White,22 the Supreme Court said:
". .. Acts necessary to peace and good order among citizens,
such for example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage and
the domestic relations, governing the course of descents, regulating
the conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and pro-
viding remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar
acts, which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government,
must be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual,
though unlawful government .... "
21. Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 202 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
22. 7 Wall. 700, 19 L. Ed. 227 (1868).
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The Civil War situation, however, has never been regarded as a satisfactory
precedent, for the courts have conceded to the Soviet Government a greater
degree of actual sovereignty than was ever conceded with respect to the
Confederate States. The Civil War cases were concerned mainly with the
protection of the property and contract rights of loyal United States citizens,
while in recent years the courts have, in some instances, denied effect to the
Soviet decrees, even when the result was that United States citizens were
made thereby to suffer. Contrary to statements contained in certain
reviews of this recent period, American citizenship, as such, and the protec-
tion of American nationals, has not been a determining factor in the cases
in which the Soviet decrees were given or denied effect. The nationality of
the parties has usually been deemed immaterial. A review of recent cases
does indicate, however, a considerable advance in the treatment which the
courts have given to the subject of the effect of the acts and decrees of an
unrecognized de facto government, as bearing upon private rights. The
courts have assumed that recognition is a political function, and that the
decision of the political department of the Government is conclusive upon
the courts.23 But they have also held and correctly, that it does not follow
that the courts cannot take account of facts as they exist under a defacto
regime and of the legal consequences flowing therefrom.
The New York Courts, which have had to deal with by far the larger
number of these cases, have, in this connection, adopted certain broad prin-
ciples which indicate a realistic approach to the problem. Two main prob-
lems were presented: (1) that of the status of the Russian companies that
were nationalized by the Soviet Government; (2) assuming the continued
legal existence of such companies after their nationalization, the rights of
particular persons to represent them in litigation.
The practical difficulty which the courts faced was that to apply the
ordinary rules of law to the Russian situation and to deny the old Russian
corporation any standing in court, and at the same time to deny the Soviet
Government any standing in court, would, in many cases, result in a debtor's
being relieved of the debt entirely.24 To avoid this unjust result, the courts
here and abroad were distinctly inclined to invoke some theory which would
permit a recovery. In the beginning, however, the American courts refused
to give effect to the acts and decrees of the Soviet Government on the ground
of non-recognition and consequent absence of comity. In the case of James
v. Second Russian Insurance Company, the lower court expressly said that
it would not recognize a Soviet decree nationalizing the defendant insurance
company in Russia, "because of non-recognition by our Federal authorities."
23. Rose v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241 (1808); Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202
(1890); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304 (1918).
24. There was, and still is, a considerable amount of litigation in the New York
courts with respect to funds deposited in New York banks, trust companies, and with
the Superintendent of Insurance, as security and in trust for creditors, policy holders,
etc. The New York courts authorized liquidation proceedings to dispose of these de-
posits, by first paying local creditors, and then subjecting the residue to foreign claims.
25. 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369 (1925).
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This rigid view was soon modified, and the New York courts adopted
the criterion of public policy in relation to the Soviet decrees. In the leading
New York case of Sokoloff v. National City Bank of New York,28 plaintiff, a
Russian, sued the defendant bank upon a contract to open a bank deposit
in the defendant's Petrograd branch. It was held that the Soviet decrees
confiscating the defendant's property in Russia and terminating its business
there, was not a defense. However, in his opinion, Chief Judge Cardozo
delivered the following dicta which have since received much attention:
"Juridically, a government that is unrecognized may be viewed
as no government at all, if the power withholding recognition
chooses thus to view it. In practice, however, since juridical con-
ceptions are seldom, if ever, carried to the limit of their logic, the
equivalence is not absolute, but is subject to self-imposed limita-
tions of common sense and fairness, as we learned in litigations fol-
lowing our Civil War."
He then suggested a rule, based on the analogy of the Civil War cases, which
might govern the situation in hand:
". .. a body or group which has vindicated by the course of
events its pretensions to sovereign power, but which has forfeited
by its conduct the privileges or immunities of sovereignty, may
gain for its acts and decrees a validity quasi-governmental, if vio-
lence to fundamental principles of j ustice or to our own public
policy might otherwise be done."
He reached the conclusion, however, that in the situation before him no
public policy required giving effect to the Russian decrees.
In the later case of Russian Reinsurance Company v. Stoddard and
Bankers Trust Co.,27 the New York Court of Appeals made a departure from
the rigid rule that acts and decrees of unrecognized governments cannot be
applied in the United States. The defendant there claimed that the plaintiff's
existence had been terminated by the Soviet decree nationalizing insurance
companies and confiscating their property. The court held, in part, that
since the Soviet Government might thereafter sue the defendant upon the
same claim either in the United States or in some country which recognized
the Soviet Government and in which the defendant bank was doing business,
the defendant (in a suit in equity) should not be subjected to the danger of
such a double liability. The plaintiff was, therefore, not allowed to recover.
In other words, it would be against justice and public policy, in that par-
ticular case, to deny validity to the decree of the Soviet Government.
However, in later New York cases (actions at law, in which the defense
of double-liability was not admitted), it was held that the Russian companies
continued to exist, in spite of the Soviet decrees of nationalization, at least
to the extent and for the purpose of recovering money or property which
26. 239 N. Y. 158, 145 N. E. 917 (1924); 250 N. Y. 69, 164 N. E. 745 (192S).
27. 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703 (1925).
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was owed to the old corporation." It was stated that "the corporation sur-
vives in such a sense and in such a degree that it may still be dealt with as a
persona in lands where the decrees of the Soviet Republic are not recognized
as law."-9  In these cases, however, the courts indicated that their decisions
were based upon particular grounds limited to the type of case which they
were then considering.
Recognition, when it came in November, 1933, did not make any appre-
ciable difference in respect to the treatment given by the courts to the
question of the status of the former Russian corporations seeking to collect
debts and property owing to the former corporation." In the case of Vladi-
kavkazsky Railway Company v. New York Trust Company,3' it was similarly
held, after recognition, "that although the corporation in question was ex-
tinguished in its homeland and there dead in the eyes of the law, it continued
its existence as 'a juristic person with capacity to sue' in this State." Here
again, the court stressed considerations peculiar to this case-the fact that
the contract in question, a bank deposit, was made in New York, was to be
performed in New York entirely outside Russian jurisdiction, and hence was
governed by the law of New York, and further that it would be against the
public policy of the State of New York to permit a debtor to hold the prop-
erty of its creditor indefinitely.
There are some cases, however, in which the New York courts did not
hesitate to give full force and effect to the decrees of the Soviet Government.
In the case of Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,32 the Court of
Appeals held the defendant not liable on contracts of insurance made and
to be performed in Russia, which contracts were cancelled by decrees of the
Soviet Government. It is interesting to note that some of the policy holders
were American citizens. In Salimoff v. Standard Oil Company,33 the court
held that the plaintiff had been completely divested of all interest in certain
lands in Russia by virtue of Soviet decrees confiscating the lands, which
lands were later sold to the defendant.
The Salimoff case was decided by the New York court prior to recog-
nition; the Dougherty case was decided after recognition. The fact of
recognition, however, seems to have made no real difference in the rationale
of the court's decisions.3 4 In both of these cases the situs of the property
28. Joint Stock Co. v. National City Bank, 240 N. Y. 368, 148 N. E. 552 (1925);
First Russian Insurance Company v. Beha, 240 N. Y. 601, 148 N. E. 722 (1925); Petro-
gradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N. E. 479 (1930).
29. Petrogradsky M. K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 36, 170 N. E.
479, 484 (1930).
30. The principle of retroactivity, as applied to the validity of the acts and decrees
of the foreign government when recognized, is now generally admitted. Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U. S. 304 (1918).
31. 263 N. Y. 369, 189 N. E. 456 (1934).
32. 266 N. Y. 71, 193 N. E. 642 (1934).
33. 262 N. Y. 220, 186 N. E. 679 (1933).
34. However, in the Salimoff case, the court did point out that the Department of
State had taken cognizance of the defacto existence and authority of the Soviet Govern-
ment.
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or contract was wholly within Russia and governed exclusively by Russian
law. It would seem, therefore, that these cases might well have been de-
cided by the application of the familiar principles of conflict of laws. But
the New York court chose to rely upon the more difficult and uncertain
theory announced in the dictum of the Sokoloff case, wherein the test was
whether "violence to fundamental principles of justice or to our own public
policy might otherwise be done."
The courts of Great Britain, France, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany
have also had to deal with questions arising out of the Russian situation.
Those countries gave recognition, de facto or de jure, to the Soviet Govern-
ment long prior to the time when recognition was accorded by the United
States Government. It is, therefore, interesting to note the manner in
which those foreign courts dealt with the situation.
In England, which gave defacto recognition to the Soviet Government
in 1921 and de jure recognition in 1924, the courts at first gave full effect to
the decrees of the Soviet Government.5 Later, however, they became more
cautious in applying the Soviet nationalization decrees. For a time the
House of Lords took the view that the decrees were mere declarations of
policy rather than legislative measures, and held that they did not terminate
the life of the Russian corporations, at least not the branches in Great
Britain. 6  Later, however, and on the basis of more complete evidence,
the House of Lords held that the Soviet nationalization decrees did termi-
nate the corporate existence of certain Russian banks.37 In Perry v. Equit-
able Life Assurance Society," it was held that the plaintiff could not recover
on a life insurance policy issued in Russia, and payable in Russia, because
of the Soviet nationalization decree which cancelled all life insurance con-
tracts in Russia and confiscated the property and assets of the insurance
companies. Thus the English court gave full effect, in England, to the
Soviet decree cancelling a Russian contract-and this, in spite of the fact
that defendant had assets in England and in the jurisdiction of the court.
France recognized the Soviet Government in 1924. Prior to recognition
the French courts gave no legal effect to the Soviet decrees of nationaliza-
tion. 9 Since recognition the nationalization decrees have been given effect
in the French courts, and Russian corporations are deemed to have been
dissolved in Russia.40 However, the French courts do make an exception,
35. Luther v. Sagor, (1921) 3 K. B. 532; Sea Ins. Co. v. Russia Ins. Co., 17 Lloyds
List L. R. 316 (1923).
36. Banque Internationale v. Goukassow, (1925) A. C. 150; Russian Commercial and
Industrial Bank v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse, (1925) A. C. 112.
37. Lazard Bros. and Co. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., (1923) A. C. 289; In re Russian
Bank for Foreign Trade, 1 Ch. D. 745 (1933); Russian and English Bank v. Baring Bros.,
52 T. L. R. 393 (1936).
38. 45 T. L. R. 468 (1929). But cf. Buerger v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 43 T. L. R.
601 (1927) in which a contrary conclusion was reached, on the basis, however, of uncon-
tradicted testimony as to Russian law.
39. Hornstein v. Banque Russo-Asiatique, 54 Clunet 1075 (1927); Kharon v. Banque
Russe pour le Commerce et l'Industrie, 50 Clunet 533 (1923).
40. Andr6 v. La Union et le Phenix Espagnol, 53 Clunet 126 (1926).
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in this regard, in a case in which the Russian corporation has attained a de
facto existence in France either by substantial localization in France or by
reconstitution under French law.4' In some cases the French Courts have
held it contrary to the public policy of the forum to give effect to the decrees
of confiscation, as distinguished from dissolution.
42
Germany gave de jure recognition to the Soviet Government in 1922.
The courts of Germany wavered, and in some instances reversed themselves,
on the effect of the Soviet decrees. The prevailing view seems, however, to
give effect to the Soviet decrees, and to hold that Russian corporations did
not continue as legal entities capable of suing in the German courts.A4
In Switzerland, although that government had not then recognized the
Soviet Government, the highest legal tribunal held that the Soviet national-
ization decrees terminated the legal existence of the corporation, and refused
to let a Swiss branch of the Russian corporation maintain a suit, "the exis-
tence of a branch being impossible without the principal office upon which
this secondary place of business depends." 44 However, in later cases a more
liberal view was taken with respects to the Swiss assets of a Russian company.4
The Italian courts refused to apply the Soviet decree nationalizing the
commercial fleet, on the ground that it was contrary to the public order of
Italy."
Thus there appears to be some conflict between the American and the
foreign decisions, particularly in regard to the dissolution of Russian corpora-
tions by the Soviet decrees. This conflict would seem not to depend upon
the recognition and non-recognition of the Soviet Government, but rather
upon a difference in the application of principles of conflict of laws.
On the whole, the courts here and elsewhere have been inclined to mini-
mize the significance of recognition, at least to the extent of protecting the
rights of individuals. It was, perhaps, inevitable that in attempting to
arrive at substantial justice in each particular case with its peculiar facts,
certain inconsistences should exist. Considering the novel and extremely
difficult character of many of the problems presented, it would seem that
the recent development of the law with respect to recognition and non-
recognition has been as satisfactory as could reasonably be expected. On
41. Banque G~nrale de Commerce v. Jaudon, 52 Clunet 419 (1925); Banque Russo-
Asiatique, 54 Clunet 352 (1927).
42. Etat Russe v. Cie Russe de Navigation (Ropit), Trib. Comm. Marsaille, 52
Clunet 391 (1925), Court of Appeal of Aix, 53 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 667
(1925), 53 Clunet 667 (1926), Cour de Cassation, 55 Clunet 674 (1928), translation in
HUDSON, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (1929) 137. This case involved a Soviet decree
purporting to nationalize certain ships of the former Russian Commercial Fleet, then
lying in French ports.
43. Ginsberg v. Deutche Bank, Juristische Wochenschrift 1232 (1928).
44. Banque Internationale de Commerce de Petrograd v. Hausner, 52 Clunet 488,
489 (1923).
45. Prochorov v. Sulzer, Federal Supreme Court, Ost. R. Z. 1930, 541 (1929).
46. Nomis de Pollone et Svarono Fatis v. Cooperative Garabaldi Federazione
Italiana Lavoratori del Mare, 52 Clunet 225 (1925). Cf. Cap. Katsikis v. Sociftl Fati
Svorone de Pollone, Tribunale di Genoa, 50 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1021
(1923).
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the whole the judiciary has adopted a fairly realistic attitude toward the
entire problem. While the courts have withheld from unrecognized govern-
ments the rights which clearly depend upon recognition, they have not re-
garded the government's refusal to give recognition as conclusive on the
question of the factual existence of the foreign sovereign and the legal conse-
quences of its acts. Very properly, when the fact was not clear, as in some
of the Mexican cases, the courts relied upon the executive's finding of fact.
When, however, as in the case of Russia, the executive's decision as to recog-
nition bore no relation to the admitted factual existence of the foreign
government and its sovereignty over its territory, the courts have faced
the facts squarely. The courts have in numerous instances accepted the
facts, in preference to political theory, and have given to the facts their legal
consequences, regardless of political non-recognition of the Government.
In doing that, however, it has not generally been thought that the courts
were meddling or interfering with the exclusive function of the executive in
the conduct of our foreign relations.
Although the decisions in most of the cases may have been just and war-
ranted by the unprecedented character of the problem, the reasons for the
decisions, as given by the courts, have not been entirely satisfactory. The
test suggested by the New York Court of Appeals in the Sokolofi case and
later applied in other cases, namely, that the acts and decrees of an unrecog-
nized foreign government may be given effect by our courts "if violence to
fundamental principles of justice or to our own public policy might otherwise
be done," can hardly serve as a workable general principle. Although it
may result in substantial justice, as indeed it has in particular cases, it is,
nevertheless, subject to serious objection because of its uncertainty and its
susceptibility to varying interpretation. Furthermore, as recent cases
illustrate, it raises serious question as to judicial competence.
It is believed that the ordinary principles of conflict of laws will suffice
in the solution of most of the problems that arise in connection with the
effect of the acts and decrees of foreign governments, recognized or un-
recognized, if their factual existence be undisputed. It is, of course, uni-
versally admitted that the acts and decrees of a foreign government do not
ex proprio vigore have any extra-territorial effect. But in certain situations,
under ordinary principles of conflict of laws, our own law does give certain
force and effect to foreign laws; in doing so, the foreign law is merely re-
garded as one of the facts in the situation.47  Let us take, for example, a
marriage entered into abroad. The validity of that marriage, under our
own law, depends upon its validity where solemnized.48 A marriage which
has taken place in Russia, though perhaps not in accordance with the pro-
cedure prescribed by our own law, may nevertheless be regarded as valid
47. See I BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 5.4; GooDRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1927) § 6; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.
48. 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 47, § 121.2; GoonRcH, op. cit. supra note 47 § 113.
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here. 49 Hence the foreign law is applied in determining the validity of the
marriage, not because the foreign law has any force here, but because our
law determines the question of the validity of the contract by the lex loci
contractus. The foreign law is proved as one of the facts, and our own law
is then applied thereto. It would seem to be of little consequence, therefore,
that our Government has refused to enter into diplomatic relations with the
foreign government under whose laws the marriage was solemnized. In
thus solving the problem, the courts are not helping the foreign government
to enforce its laws, but are merely enforcing our own conception of the rights
of the parties.
Of course, the cases with which our courts have had to deal are not so
simple as the marriage contract illustration. Nevertheless, it is believed that
the usual principles of conflict of laws will meet most situations.
However, serious questions have arisen because of certain exceptions
which some courts have made in the application of conflict of law principles,
namely, the exception of "public policy." It has been said that reference
to the foreign law may be rejected where inconsistent with the public policy
of the forum."0 Questions as to "public policy" have arisen both before and
since the United States Government accorded recognition to the Soviet
Government. It is directly involved in many of the cases now pending in
our courts which arose out of the Russian situation. The public policy in
question relates primarily to the confiscation effected by the Soviet Govern-
ment. This is the principal issue in certain cases which are now pending
49. There seems to be no decision directly in point. However, in Banque de France
v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 202, 205 (S. D. N. Y. 1929), there is dictum to the effect
that "a marriage which is valid under laws of the present government in Russia is quite
universally regarded as valid in this country." Accord, Nachimson v. Nachimson, 143
L. T. R. 254 (1930). Contra: Jelinkova v. De Serbouloff, Pasicrisie Beige (1926), III,
131, 54 Clunet 189, ANNUAL DIGEST, 1925-1926, Case No. 20; Chiger v. Chiger, 53 Jour.
de Droit Int. 943 (1926); ANNUAL DIGEST, 1925-1926, Case No. 18; Soviet Marriages in
Hungary Case, ANNUAL DIGEST, 1925-1926, Case No. 22.
50. Aside from the recognition cases discussed in this article, the "public policy"
exception raises interesting questions generally, and particularly in relation to foreign
marriage and divorce, already referred to. An interesting problem is presented in de-
termining the effect to be given here to a polygamous or incestuous marriage contracted
in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the law of that jurisdiction. Although it is
generally assumed that such a marriage is contrary to public policy in this country, in a
recent opinion of the Attorney General of the United States, a marriage between an uncle
and his niece contracted in Poland in accordance with Polish law, was accepted as creating
a status of husband and wife in this country, for the purpose of admission under the immi-
gration law. The headnote to the opinion reads as follows: "A man, while a citizen of
the United States and a resident of the State of Virginia, married his niece in Poland, and
later petitioned the Secretary of Labor for the issuance of an immigration visa for his
alien wife under section 4(a) of the Immigration Act of 1924. The Secretary of Labor
approved the petition and accorded the wife the status of a non-quota immigrant. Held,
that, as the marriage between the uncle and his neice was lawful in Poland, and as the
uncle and his neice may maintain the relation of husband and wife at the place of his
residence in Virginia. provided the uncle left Virginia for Poland without any intention
of marrying his niece, there is no legal ground for refusing to accept the certificate of the
Department of Labor as to the wife's status." 37 Ops. ATT' GEN. 102 (1933).
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in both the State5l and United States courts, 2 in which the issues arose as
follows: as a part of the agreements whereby the United States accorded
recognition to the Soviet Government, the latter assigned to the United
States Government all of its claims, as successor of prior governments or
otherwise, against American nationals, including its claim to assets in this
country, which assets were formerly owned by Russian corporations which
had been nationalized and their property confiscated by the Soviet Govern-
ment . 3 The United States Government, as assignee, is now suing, under
this assignment, to recover funds found here. The principal defense asserted
is that it is contrary to American public policy to give effect, even indirectly,
to the Soviet decrees of confiscation. In these pending suits the question is
further complicated by the fact that the United States Government is itself
the plaintiff, and alleges the assignment of the Soviet Government as its
source of title.
The public policy concept is indeed wrapped in considerable vagueness,
and has therefore given rise to a sharp conflict in judicial expression on the
subject. For instance, the New York Court of Appeals 4 recently said:
"The principle which determines whether we shall give effect
to foreign legislation is that of public policy. . . . That the confis-
cation decree in question, clearly contrary to our public policy, was
enacted by a government recognized by us, affords no controlling
reason why it should be enforced in our courts."
On the other hand, in a recent case in a Federal court, 5 it was stated as
follows:
"When, therefore, the Soviet Government was recognized, the
courts lost all right to continue to inject their prerecognition con-
ceptions of public policy into the international panorama in manifest
derogation of the express determination of the political department
and the clear juridical implications of the act of recognition ...
To impeach this legislation now in the courts as being against our
public policy would clearly trench upon the sphere of the executive
who has already decided the matter in a manner that concludes our
courts."5
51. Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., pending in the New
York Supreme Court, New York County.
52. United States v. Morgan Belmont, 85 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
53. See note of the Soviet Ambassador (Troyanovsky) to the Secretary of State,
dated July 21, 1936, with respect to the scope of the Assignment of November 16, 1933.
This note appears in the record of the case of Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York
& Trust Co., now pending in the Supreme Court of New York County.
54. Vladikavkazsky Ry. v. New York Trust Co., 263 N. Y. 369 (1934).
55. Opinion of Manton, C. J. (dissenting on another point) in United States v.
Bank of New York and Trust Co., 77 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
56. In a case involving confiscation by a revolutionary government in Mexico, the
Supreme Court of the United States said: "To these principles we must add that: 'Every
soveriegn State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and
the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the act of the government of another
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The cases which have been presented to our courts, therefore, raise interest-
ing questions as to the existence and extent of the public policy exception to
the application of the ordinary rules. Who is to determine the public policy
that is to be applied? Where there is a local, as distinct from a national,
public policy, which is to prevail? Does the action taken by the President
of the United States in according recognition to the Soviet Government and
accepting an assignment of its claims, constitute a declaration of national
policy? Are certain constitutional and legislative declarations and prohi-
bitions, obviously directed to action by the State or Federal Government, to
be taken as controlling with respect to legislation enacted by a foreign gov-
ernment? These are some of the questions which the so-called "recognition
cases" present, and which remain to be passed upon by the Supreme Court
of the United States. 57
Obviously, the granting of recognition by the United States Govern-
ment has not solved most of the legal questions. It has, of course, had the
effect of giving to the Soviet Government a standing in our courts. It has
also eliminated certain problems as to the right of representation of the
State of Russia. But most of the questions as to private rights still remain
and to a considerable extent are unaffected by recognition. These are
problems which challenge the attention and ingenuity of the bar generally.
The frequent occurrence in recent years of changes in governments
throughout the world and the divergence in national policy of various gov-
ernments with respect to the recognition of new governments, have created
an anomalous situation resulting in much legal confusion. The legal prin-
ciples and rules applicable are in need of clarification, particularly as concerns
the nature of recognition and the legal effects of non-recognition. It is
believed that the subject now calls for study and discussion, particularly by
those now engaged in the restatement of the American law and the prepara-
tory work looking toward the codification of international law.
done within its own territory'." Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 303 (1918).
When this question arose in an English court, the following statement was made: "But it
appears a serious breach of international comity, if a state is recognized as a sovereign
independent state to postulate that its legislation is 'contrary to essential principles ofjustice and morality.' Such an allegation might well with a susceptible foreign govern-
ment become a casus helli; and should in my view be the action of the Sovereign through
his ministers, and not of the judges in reference to a state which their Sovereign has recog-
nized." Luther v. Sagor, (1921) 3. K. B. 532, 558.
57. The case of United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U. S. 463 (1936),
went off solely on the question of jurisdiction of the Federal court. The merits of the
case were not touched upon by the Supreme Court.
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